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Abstract: Kuhn (1977) considered that criteria for scientific theory choice function as values and not as rules what
implies: i) the debatable character of their attribution, ii) the gradual nature of their compliance and iii) the necessity
to weigh them up in a multidimensional values-based judgment. Kuhn also emphasized: 1) the agent-related nature of
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1. Introduction
Thomas Kuhn’s “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” (included in the book The
essential tension, 1977, pp. 320-339) is still today a major reference in philosophical debates on
the justification of scientific claims. The text tried to respond to widespread charges of relativism
directed to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962,2 1970a), where Kuhn had assumed that
the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical evidence (what Kuhn rather restrictedly
calls “proof,” Cf. Stanford, 2017) called for “techniques of persuasion, or argument and
counterargument” (Cf. 1970a, pp. 151-152) in theory choice.
Certainly, this sounded rather more shocking then than it does now. The more than forty
years passed since its publication have seen the development of argumentation theory and
argumentation studies and it should not be surprising that we are now in a better position to both
clarify and assess what Kuhn wanted to say about these problematic questions. Although Kuhn
does not use the concepts and tools developed by contemporary argumentation theorist (not even
those already available to him at that time), one of the aims of this paper is showing how most of
his insights can now be better appreciated by employing them.
Kuhn’s “Objectivity…” (1977) extended and deepened the line of response to received
criticism he had already outlined in at least two previous texts:
-

the 1969 “Postcript”, included in The Structure’s second edition (1970a) and,
“Reflections on my Critics”, his contribution to the collective volume edited by I.
Lakatos & A. Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970b).

His aim was now trying to identify the kinds of “argument and counterargument” that were
common in scientific controversies and to expose how they did function in a process of theory
choice, with the intention of revealing up to what point rationality and objectivity were still
honored. The difficult part was, nevertheless, that in order to do so, he had to make a conceptual
work of dissociation (Cf. Tindale, 2010) and propose a new way to understand both notions of
rational justification and objectivity.
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In this paper, I’ll try to analyze Kuhn’s ideas and conceptual proposals using, among other
things, the tools and framework provided by H. Marraud’s “arguments’ dialectic” (2015) whose
performance for clarifying scientific argument I have already exploited in my recent papers on
abduction (2019, 2020a).
One of the things that become clear once we face Kuhn’s text is that the topics mentioned in
its title are approached exactly in the reverse order and I’ll do the same here. Thus, Kuhn starts by
analyzing the kinds of criteria (kinds of reasons) involved in theory choice, revisiting a list he had
already offered in previous texts and trying to show that those who accuse him of depicting “theory
choice” as a non-rational process are misguided. I’ll revise these aspects in Section 2 “The
Rationality of Theory Choice.” Then, Kuhn states that these criteria work not as rules but as values
(or maxims or norms, says he, 1977, p. 330). This is the central argumentative point, as what Kuhn
is pointing at –and allegedly clarifying with his illustrative examples from the history of science–
is precisely “The Argumentative Workings of Values,” as I approach the issue in Section 3. Finally,
what remains is to vindicate the kind of objectivity (if any) that’s behind this kind of exchanges.
I’ll revise Kuhn’s suggestions in Section 4, “Objectivity within the Space of Reasons” and, in
Section 5, “The Rational Dynamics of Science.”
My main conclusion (expressed by my own title) is that Kuhn’s dissociative concept of
judgmental subjectivity, called for to replace an elusive (ideally a priori and agent-independent)
objectivity, is probably his most valuable contribution, opening the possibility for a more
dynamical, practical and definitely agent-based understanding of the exchange of reasons in
scientific decisions about theoretical choices.
2. The rationality of theory choice
That there is no algorithmic methodology for systematic theory choice within the sciences was, at
the same time, the point of departure of Kuhn’s ground-breaking proposal and a well-established
result accepted, by then, by most philosophers of science (as Kuhn duly acknowledges).1 The
peculiarity of Kuhn’s approach, though is that he does not see this as a regrettable condition, “an
eliminable imperfection” but as “the essential nature of science” (1977, p. 330). I gladly translate
Kuhn’s insight here as boldly stating the argumentative nature of science.
Empirical proof –i.e. experimental confirmation (in any case gradual) of the observational
consequences implied by theories– is never decisive (it underdetermines theory choice), but
neither are mandatorily decisive, in an absolute way, the value-based “argument and
counterargument” explored by Kuhn. There is always room for disagreement. Furthermore, as
Kuhn insists, there is always room for reasonable (even scientifically-based) disagreement.
Although there are concrete cases where recalcitrant and stubborn positions in scientific matters
might be identified and criticized as such (by the majority of a community), this cannot be done in
an algorithmic or unanswerable way. The argumentative situation (as it happens in legal matters)
remains, as science keeps going on, and theories are assessed and accepted as currently valid.
This is essential in Kuhn’s account and something that not everybody welcomed in 1977 (or
in 1973, when the lecture that originated the paper took place). In his 1980 review on Kuhn’s book,
particularly centered on this piece, H. Siegel started by agreeing, to a certain extent, with Kuhn.
Siegel quoted at length the following paragraph from the “Postcript,” of which the text of

“Most philosophers of science would, therefore, I think, now regard the sort of algorithm which has traditionally
been sought as a not quite attainable ideal” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 326).
1
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“Objectivity…” seems to be a more detailed development, and stated, “This paragraph of Kuhn’s
seems unexceptionable” (Siegel, 1980, p. 364):
Nothing about that relatively familiar thesis [i.e., no algorithm] implies either that
there are no good reasons for being persuaded or that these reasons are not ultimately
decisive for the group. Nor does it even imply that the reasons for choice are different
from those usually listed by philosophers of science: accuracy, simplicity,
fruitfulness and the like. What it should suggest, however, is that such reasons
function as values and that they can thus be differently applied, individually and
collectively, by men who concur in honoring them. If two men disagree, for example,
about the relative fruitfulness of their theories, or if they agree about that but disagree
about the relative importance of fruitfulness and say, scope in reaching a choice,
neither can be convicted of a mistake. Nor is either being unscientific. There is no
neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure which,
properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same decision. (Kuhn,
1970a, pp. 199-200)
But Siegel finally blamed Kuhn for not trying to solve this problem that threats the rationality of
scientific justification. If the usual criteria are not enough to close the gap, he should be looking
for meta-criteria (preferably “external” to paradigmatic, self-referential and self-justifying
frameworks) in order to overcome, in a more definitive way, disagreement in scientific
controversies.2
Siegel specially criticized Kuhn’s “reluctance to give up the incommensurability thesis”
(1980, p. 365) that would prevent effective communication and reasonable dispute between
scientists working within different paradigms. He, ultimately, considers that Kuhn “cannot have
it both ways” (1980, p. 366), in the sense that, if he is honestly looking for criteria and good reasons
for, if not settling, at least advancing scientific controversies in a rational way, he cannot, at the
same time, insist on the idea of incommensurable and incommunicable paradigms.
I think Siegel was absolutely right spotting this kind inconsistency in Kuhn, but the truth is
that in the text of “Objectivity…” the vocabulary of incommensurability is remarkably avoided
(though not explicitly denied) and there is even a suggestion towards the end of the text about
means other-than-linguistic to overcome problems of incommunicability. I’ll come to this later. At
this point, I will just mention that even abandoning the blocking version of incommensurability –
something I’m more than happy to do–, I somewhat understand Kuhn’s “reluctance” to embrace a
too confident view of the possibilities of finding a, however complicated, model of theory choice
that finally would close the rationality gap in the way required by his critics. That is why I think
some redescriptions of his proposals as leading to a complete traditionally understood
methodology as R. Nola’s (2000) or those who translate them into Bayesian terms, as Salmon’s or
Earman’s (Cf. Farmakis, 2008), somehow miss the point.
And the point is, as I see it, that the context of scientific controversy remains an
argumentative context (vs. a demonstrative one) all through reasonable debates and reasonable
theoretical choices made. Those defending an innovative and more fruitful and more coherent
scientific theory are reasonable and rational as long as they are prepared to present assessable,
field-relevant reasons for their choices and those who resist the new proposal might also be
reasonable and rational as long as they do the same. And there is no a priori, universally applicable,
2

Siegel mentions in this regard the work conducted by Scheffler (1967).
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philosophical way to stop it. Only relatively instable, though often robust, assessable as properly
discussed, but in the end communal, field-dependent choices based on good reasons.3
This, I claim, is not renouncing rationality but redefining it with a dissociative move.
Rational people, according to such move, would be those who “give reasons,” “ask for reasons,”
“look for the best available reasons,” and “criticize other’s reasons,” etc., and who do so mostly
using (and sometimes discussing) the standards of the field they are involved in; not those who
know of the right method for reaching decisions and apply it. Science (as an argumentative field)
may have agreed on (relatively permanent and even relatively constitutive) basic criteria that act
as sources of reasonable argument, but, even then, these are not going to dictate or determine
choices but just guide discussions. This would mean to advance a procedural or methodological
vs. an achievement-centered notion of rationality.
Kuhn is happy to look for, describe and discuss those basic criteria that make of scientific
endeavor what it is –at least for now (Cf. Kuhn, 1983). But he is also eager to specify the way the
items in his non-exhaustive list of criteria work in argumentative exchanges (as values, says he,
and not as rules) in order to keep scientific discussion and controversy feasible and recognizable
but, at the same time, open. As is well known, the five criteria listed by Kuhn in “Objectivity…,”
expressed as desirable characteristics or features eligible scientific theories should have, are
(Kuhn, 1977, pp. 321-322):
1. Being accurate: i.e. empirically adequate (especially regarding predictions)
according to observation and experimentation.4
2. Being consistent: both internally (showing absence of contradiction) and externally
(proving coherent with other theories and background assumptions).
3. Having broad scope: theoretical consequences should be of the kind that makes
them extensible to phenomena outside its first realm of inquiry in order to avoid ad
hoc theories.5
4. Being simple: its explanatory principles should be kept as simple as possible.
5. Being fruitful: it should reveal (or help revealing) new phenomena, enlarge the field
of inquiry, open new research perspectives.
Even if Kuhn’s text does not say it explicitly (although it is rather implied by the term “choice”
and by his examples), it seems clear that, in general circumstances, these criteria cannot be just
applied qualitatively. This is not just a checklist that theories must go through. We will typically
be in a gradual and comparative situation.6 The idea is to choose the theory that is deemed more
precise, coherent, ample, simple, and (or) fruitful among the available alternatives. What Kuhn
As philosopher of science A. Cordero has put it: “Science simply did not have the clear and eternal form positivists
had imagined it have. Nor, for that matter, did it have any invariant form. If, earlier on, the radicalness of scientific
innovation had blended smoothly with the formalist tenets of logical positivism, the mixture fell apart when historical
research revealed that science changes, virtually at all levels, as its contents develops. Science, it seemed, was not
characterizable in essentialist terms of any kind” (Cordero, 1991, pp. 400-401).
4
This is the most traditionally acknowledged Empiricist criterion and, for some philosophers of science, the only one,
according to the principle of Knowledge Empiricism: “if the data alone do not suffice to determine a theory’s truthvalue, then nothing does” (Douven, 2005, p. 282).
5
This desideratum responds to the ideal of scientific unification and aims at avoiding the multiplication of explanatory
principles (Kitcher, 1989).
6
This is not incompatible with there being some threshold of compliance that would simply exclude some manifestly
implausible or inadequate theories.
3
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does emphasize, instead (as he already did in the “Postcript”), is the problematic character of the
operative, i.e., argumentative, use of such criteria. He mentions two distinct problems (Kuhn,
1977, p. 322):
a)
b)

“[c]riteria are imprecise: individuals may legitimately differ about their
application to concrete cases”;
“[w]hen deployed together, they repeatedly prove to conflict with one another.”

Surprisingly enough, Kuhn says that these difficulties are “relatively familiar” so that he will
“devote little time to their elaboration” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 322). They are, of course, in the sense that
we find them everywhere in our daily lives, but this doesn’t mean that they cannot be better
clarified. I claim that the examples from the history of science that Kuhn offers in order to just
“briefly illustrate” these problems merit some analysis on our part with the help of our
contemporary argumentative tools.
Because it is precisely in them that Kuhn’s final suggestion that the criteria work, (i.e.
argumentatively speaking) as values and not as rules is, in practical terms, though perhaps more
ostensibly than explicitly, exposed.
3. The argumentative working of values
So we have problem a), imprecise criteria, and problem b), conflicting criteria. Regarding problem
a), Kuhn assumes that there is, again, no algorithm, no univocal rule to attribute to a scientific
theory the kind of characteristics listed by him. Not even comparatively speaking. Thus,
comparative attribution of these desiderata (as Kuhn calls them in other texts, Cf. Kuhn, 1983) is
the first argumentative situation he describes. Reasons, i.e. substantive reasons, based on
substantive warrants (not on purely semantic or formal rules)7 must be adduced for such
comparative attributions, and this means that there might be controversies between opposing but,
in principle, likely reasonable comparative attributions.
His example to illustrate this problem is the conflict (end of 18th c.) between the “theory of
phlogiston” (defended by Georg E. Stahl) and the “theory of oxygen” (defended by Antoine
Lavoisier) in the chemistry of combustion, regarding the first criterion, accuracy. According to
Kuhn, both theories presented a certain degree of accuracy –in connection with different aspects
of the phenomena involved– that made reasonable the comparative attribution of the criterion in
favor of one or of the other, thus:

7

In another paper (Olmos, 2020b), I attribute to such substantive warrants the following two properties (insofar as
they are verbalized or made explicit, something that does not always happen or need to happen): i) their general (or
regular) but typically non-universal character (i.e. their not being universally quantified statements) and ii) the
substantive as opposed to formal nature of the relation they express (so that they always mention a respect, a concept,
containing the alleged kind of link between reason and claim that goes beyond formal derivation).
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Table 1
Oxygen theory correctly predicts (or explains) weigh relations
in chemical reactions. Phlogiston theory does not.
The accuracy of a scientific
theory is attributed on the
basis of its predictive (or
explanatory) capacity:

So
Oxygen theory is more accurate than phlogiston theory.

Phlogiston theory correctly predicts (or explains) the chemical
similarity between metals. Oxygen theory does not.
The accuracy of a scientific
theory is attributed on the
basis of its predictive (or
explanatory) capacity:

So
Phlogiston theory is more accurate than oxygen theory

Acknowledging the rational (and even field-adequate) character of both initial attributions, in a
situation like this, what rationality dictates is that we keep looking for further criteria to ground
our choice (as Siegel sensibly suggested). As Kuhn points out:
[a] scientist would need to decide the area in which accuracy was more significant.
About that matter chemists could and did differ without violating any of the criteria
outlined above, or any others yet to be suggested. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 323)
Kuhn is right but, stopping here, he does not specify that those who make such decisions will
typically, in a public and collective sphere as is that of science, be required to offer reasons to back
them too, in a second argumentative situation that calls for meta-argumentative weighing (Olmos,
2016).
I will suggest here that a possible (just one possible) weighing judgment about “the
significance of one area above the other”, in this particular case, could be based on the
appreciation of the measurable (i.e., quantitative, metric concepts) over the qualitatively
appreciated (i.e., qualitative concepts) that characterizes certain developments in modern (and
contemporary) science. This kind of balance between opposing arguments can be diagrammed
thus:8

Measurability (using metric concepts) could be another of those criteria “yet to be suggested” as a criterion for
eligible scientific theories –it has been, in fact, by some philosophers of science. Such use of one criterion or
desideratum to weigh up conflicting attributions of another criterion, or conflicts between different criteria, will be
discussed later.
8
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Table 2
Weigh relations in chemical reactions are measurable. Chemical similarity between metals
is a qualitative concept.
Metric concepts
(magnitudes)
characterize
advanced science:

So
Phlogiston theory
correctly predicts
(or explains) the
chemical similarity
between metals.
Oxygen theory does
not.

Oxygen theory
correctly predicts (or
explains) weigh
relations in chemical
reactions. Phlogiston
theory does not.
The accuracy of
a scientific
theory is
measured by its
predictive (or
explanatory)
capacity:

>
So

So

Oxygen theory is
more accurate than
phlogiston theory.

Phlogiston theory is
more accurate than
oxygen theory

The accuracy of
a scientific
theory is
measured by its
predictive (or
explanatory)
capacity:

So
The kind of accuracy shown by oxygen theory seems more promising for scientific
development than the kind of accuracy showed by phlogiston theory.
So
I (Lavoisier speaks) choose oxygen theory and recommend that choice

Notice the agent-related character of the conclusion and its practical nature as a personal decision
and a recommendation to the relevant community. It is human agents that recognize non-formal,
non-purely-semantic reasons for a conclusion9 and that propose them to be discussed and assessed
by other human agents.
And yet, in this case, we are still lucky. We have been able to reconstruct the conflicting
comparative attributions of accuracy as based on the same warrant (added by me, but implied by
Kuhn’s way of presenting the case), what makes them more easily comparable by a rather simple
balance judgment. But Kuhn is conscious that this is not always so easy. Problem a), imprecision,
does not only affect the way we comparatively attribute one criterion, understood in a single,
agreed-on, way. It might also be the outcome of different conceptions of (or different ways of
attributing) what is deemed to be the same criterion.

What J. Woods (2016, p. 101) conceptualizes as properly understood inferences, insisting on “the depth of the
implication-inference divide” and the distinction between the logical space of relations between statements and the
psychological space of consequence recognition and drawing: “If consequence-having obtains in logical space,
consequence-spotting occurs elsewhere. It occurs in psychological space – in the spotter’s head, indeed in his
“recognition subspace”, as we might say. If so, consequence-drawing likewise occurs in psychological space, in a subregion of psychological space which I’ll call his “inference subspace”, within which consequences are believed for a
reason, and the reason is supplied by the premisses from which that conclusion follows. It is easy to see that
consequence-spotting and consequence-drawing are natural processes. When they occur they do so on the fourdimensional wordline of some or other individual”.
9
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This is what happens in another of Kuhn’s historical examples: Heliocentric (Copernicus’)
vs. Geocentric (Ptolemy’s) astronomical systems. He will use this example mainly to illustrate
problem b), i.e., conflicting criteria (namely the conflict between simplicity and consistency), but
he further acknowledges that simplicity itself might be comparably attributed on also conflicting
grounds thus:
Table 3
Heliocentric theory and geocentric theory require more or less
the same calculating effort to predict the position of a planet
at a particular time
Simplicity is attributed on
the basis of the operations
the use of a theory
requires:

So
Heliocentric and Geocentric theories are equivalent in
simplicity

Heliocentric theory describes the trajectories of the planets as
simple circles. Geocentric theory describes the trajectories of
the planets as circular motions around circles (epicicles).
Simplicity is attributed on
the basis of the ontological
austerity or clarity of the
model a theory defines:

So
Heliocentric theory is simpler than Geocentric theory

According to Kuhn’s presentation of the historical case, the conflicting grounds (different
warrants) present here a final result in which there is, at least superficially, one tie and one win for
Heliocentrism. We could say that Heliocentrism takes the overall win at simplicity. But it is not
difficult to imagine that conflicting grounds could issue two opposite assessments (as in the case
of the oxygen and the phlogiston). The looked for meta-criterion, then, would have to weigh what’s
different in both (the warrants, in this case, not the way the same warrant allows for conflicting
comparative attributions).
For the sake of the argument, let us imagine that Kuhn would have suggested that (at least
at some point in its development) Ptolemy’s theory required less calculations although demanding
a more entangled geometry. We still could attribute to early 17th c. scientists, as Galileo or Kepler,
a decision favoring Heliocentrism based on, for example, a choice for realistic vs. merely
instrumental scientific theories (another value-like criterion). I represent such a weighing argument
in the following diagram. (Notice, I’m not suggesting the historical accuracy of this line of
argument, just trying to illustrate the argumentative workings of such a possibility):
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Table 4
Simple calculations for predictions are valued for instrumental reasons alone. Geometrical
austerity is valued for the ontological plausibility of the models it describes.
Science
aspires to
more than
instrumental
theories
(Scientific
realism):

So

Heliocentric theory
requires more
calculating effort to
predict the position of
a planet at a
particular time than
geocentric theory
Simplicity is
attributed on the
basis of the
calculations a
theory requires:

Heliocentric theory
describes the trajectories of
the planets as simple circles.
Geocentric theory describes
the trajectories of the planets
as circular motions around
circles (epicicles).

<
So

So

Geocentric theory is
simpler than
heliocentric theory

Heliocentric theory is
simpler than geocentric
theory

Simplicity is
attributed on
the basis of
geometric
austerity:

So
The kind of simplicity shown by Heliocentrism is more promising for scientific endeavor than
the kind of simplicity shown by Geocentrism
So
I choose Heliocentrism and recommend that choice

Notice that here a qualitative aspect of simplicity is being valued over a quantitative one (contrary
to what was assumed in the first weighing on oxygen and phlogiston theories) in a somewhat
reasonable and recognizable (though not unanswerable) way. This means that if, as suggested in
note 5, should measurability (or other value-like criterion) be added to the list, it would not help
to close, in any algorithmic way, the rationality gap. That measurability is a recognizable scientific
criterion does not mean that it is always going to play a decisive role (or the same kind of role) in
theoretical choices.
But in these comments I’m going rather beyond Kuhn. He really just presents this example
assuming that heliocentric theory is finally simpler in the proper way and that the real problem
arises, in this particular case, from the conflict between simplicity and another criterion, namely
consistency. He states, furthermore, that both theories appeared to be “internally” consistent but
that Geocentrism remained more akin to the human perception of a stable planet and more
consistent with received theories in physics (about projectiles, water pumping etc.).
So, in addition to the comparative judgments on simplicity, 17th century scientist had to count
on the following comparative (and in this case conflicting) judgment on the consistency of both
theories:

9

Table 5
Geocentric theory (stationary Earth) is consistent
with human perception and with received physics.
Heliocentric theory (moving Earth) is not.
External consistency is attributed on the basis
of compatibility with other accepted theories
and background assumptions:

So
Geocentric theory is more “externally” consistent
than heliocentric theory

The way Kuhn refers to Galileo and Kepler’s bold acceptance of Heliocentrism is not initially very
clear about the reasons behind their choice. He only says that the simplicity of Copernican theory
was “a fact vitally important to the choices made by Kepler and Galileo” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 324).
Nevertheless, we may assume, for example (again, no historical accuracy is intended), that
their prevision of what this theory could bring in terms of a unified physics for both the Earth and
the Heavens was crucial. It seems reasonable enough. This would mean, again, using some of the
remaining criteria in the list (either broad scope or fruitfulness) as a meta-criterion, to “solve”
(always in a non-algorithmic way), conflicts created by the clash between other items in the list,
thus:
(See Table 6 in next page)
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Table 6
Geometric simplicity will allow for further developments in understanding the Universe and
for the comprehension of earthly phenomena within a more general framework
The broader
scope and
fruitfulness of a
theory make it
preferable:

So

Heliocentric theory
describes the
trajectories of the
planets as simple
circles. Geocentric
theory describes the
trajectories of the
planets as circular
motions around
circles (epicicles).

Geocentric theory
(stationary Earth) is
consistent with
human perception
and received
physics.
Heliocentric theory
(moving Earth) is
not.
External
consistency is
attributed on the
basis of
compatibility with
other accepted
theories:

<
So

So

Geocentric theory
is more
“externally”
consistent than
heliocentric theory

Heliocentric theory
is simpler than
Geocentric theory

Simplicity is
attributed on the
basis of geometric
austerity:

So
I (Kepler or Galileo) choose Heliocentrism and recommend that choice

I think it is starting to be clear how this kind of argumentative workings is similar to that of values
in other kinds of argumentative settings. In, for example, political or legal discussions or, simply,
in daily life and quotidian decisions, as Kuhn suggests (1977, p. 330). They clash, they are difficult
to order, they might be used to account for choices but then those choices might be contested on
their account. They keep demanding from us to offer reasons and meta-reasons in defense of the
choices they influence (not determine). And still it is not as if we (or scientists in this case) would
have nothing to cling to:
Values like accuracy, consistency, and scope may prove ambiguous in application,
both individually and collectively; they may, that is, be insufficient basis for a shared
algorithm of choice. But they do specify a great deal: what each scientist must consider
in reaching a decision, what he may and may not consider relevant, and what he can
legitimately be required to report as the basis for the choice he had made. (Kuhn, 1977,
p. 331)
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We are now in a position to sum up what functioning as values and not as rules means
argumentatively speaking. It means at least that:
i. Their attribution functions as a “value judgment” (“value claim,” Cf. Schiappa & Nordin,
2014, p. 71ss), that is, an evaluative not a factual expression, conveying an agent-related
positive attitude towards the object to which it is attributed. Arguments supporting such
attributions are to be understood, therefore, as “evaluative arguments” (not theoretical ones).
ii. Attribution of values is typically a matter of degree. We should not expect qualitative
“value claims” assessable in a bivalent way; we will always be in a gradual and comparative
situation. Thus, the norm associated to a value (its attribution warrant) will typically not be
of the kind stating “necessary and sufficient conditions,” but substantive grounds for
comparative attribution. As we have seen, the norm of attribution itself might also have to
be selected among several recognizable possibilities. It is usually not a settled question how
we attribute what we consider a value.
iii. Values are associated to contexts and practices where their satisfaction or maximization
is assumed as desirable or commendable. That means that the positive attitude towards the
evaluated object will typically be used as a reason for its eligibility in what finally becomes
a “practical argument” describing and prescribing an action (in this case, a “theoretical
choice” that implies a series of practical decisions).
iv. Similarly, as theorists of legal argument know well, value-based practical choices
typically respond to principles of maximization (e.g. “Act so as to maximize the satisfaction
of values v1, v2…vn”) not to strict decision rules that allow for subsumption (e.g., “If
conditions a, b, c, obtain, do X”, Cf. Alexy, 1983). That is, actions are selected from a
somewhat indeterminate set of available ones as maximizing the joint satisfaction of different
values. We do not count on simple decision rules prescribing actions based on the objective
description of situations. That is a consequence of all the things we have already said together
with the basic consideration that the contexts and practices in which values count are
typically multi-value contexts. If there was just one value, and that value would not be subject
to the problems of comparative and conflicting attribution we have described, it would not
really function as a value. Criteria such as those presented by Kuhn are not values in any
essential way, they function as values. If accuracy (the usual suspect) was the only scientific
value, as some think it is, it would not function as a value anymore. It would just either
determine or underdetermine theory choice, but not make room for any discussion. A value
approach implies a multiplicity of values and all the argumentative problems (or exuberance)
concerned.
v. Choices based on value claims (practical decisions based on reasonable evaluations) call
for complicated (sophisticated) argumentation. They typically imply demands for backing
(because warrants and warrant choices are not obvious), weighing procedures and are finally
open to further demands for better grounding.
That scientific justificatory practice responds to these characteristics is Kuhn’s claim. And it
challenges certain expectations regarding science as a demonstrative (or at least simply

12

evidentiary) realm, while it seems to respond better to its characterization as a forensic activity
(Woods, 2017, pp. 143-144). And a highly disputed one, for that matter, that has given place to
extensive, time-consuming and necessarily collective controversies that still leave room for further
arguments.
This does not mean that any kind of reason and basis will be considered appropriate and
relevant in scientific choice, but just that no simple, allegedly decisive, logical (formal or semantic)
scheme will account for its rationality. This is good news for us because there is a lot of
argumentative work to do just in terms of the appropriate description of such practices and the
recognition of the field-related norms that govern them. Kuhn’s was in any case a step in the right
direction.
4. Objectivity within the space of reasons
Kuhn finally addresses the crucial issue of objectivity. If things stand how he has described them.
If scientific choices are based on the debatable attributions of not really well-defined (or variably
definable) criteria that function as values that, can be just satisfied to a certain (comparable) degree,
that clash with each other, and that argumentatively justify choices that can still be resisted…
where does the supposed objectivity of science remain?
Paradoxically enough, Kuhn’s answer is that the objectivity of science is really based on
subjectivity. Not any kind of subjectivity but judgmental subjectivity (Kuhn, 1977, pp. 336ss). This
is Kuhn’s second dissociative move. He supports this idea by exposing the judgmental character
of value-claims that are not necessarily just a question of personal taste (with no further reasons
expected) but are nevertheless necessarily a question of personal judgment (because it is people
that judge) for which rational grounds can be (and typically will be) asked:
What is discussable in my remark [that a certain film is a potboiler] is not my
characterization of my internal state, my exemplification of taste, but rather my
judgment that the film was a potboiler. […] scientists may always be asked to explain
their choices, to exhibit the bases for their judgments. Such judgments are eminently
discussable […] If my critics introduce the term subjective in a sense that opposes it
to judgmental –thus suggesting that I make theory choice undiscussable, a matter of
taste– they have seriously mistaken my position. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 337)
In empirical science we cannot resort to completely objectified agent-independent (formal or
semantic) relations between also completely objective contents. Empirical (vs. formal) science is
not the kind of practice that’s determined by logical, impersonal, relations that obtain within a
logical space (where “there are no people”, as J. Woods says, 2016, p. 101). Conclusions drawn
(by scientists) in empirical science are instead guided by substantive relations (based on warrants)
conceived of, recognized and proposed for recognition and acceptance by agents and for other
agents (and related to their personal experiences that make of them rational agents).
Science is assessed in the public space of argument, where the psychological space of
inference, as construed by J. Woods (2016) is either put to communicative work (as in Woods’
inference-based account of reasons) or is ultimately founded (as in an argument-based account of
reasons). In either case, as Kuhn insists once and again although using a different vocabulary, all
this implies the agent-related nature of processes involving the recognition of values as sources
of reasons. No algorithm is going to take the decision for a scientist. Scientists must move within
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a space of reasons where they are asked to be relevantly rational (Cf. Section 2), that is, summon,
recognize and give appropriate and field-related reasons and be prepared to substantively respond
to other agents’ counter-reasons.
Objectivity within the space of reasons is, therefore, a result of collective, public discussion,
not a prerequisite of the kinds of reasons involved in such a discussion. As a global (rather holistic)
result, it is founded on the joint concourse of individual, personal and subjective, but in any case
relevantly judgmental, contributions.
Again such kind of objectivity is not conceptually construed, as a success term (or an
achievement-centered notion) acquiring instead a procedural or methodological ring. The result
of a well conducted scientific discussion (according to the standards of the field) would be
objective (as a currently valid theory is deemed to be objective) and yet subject to further
questioning and new value judgments (personally made by human agents) in view of the
contributions of other human agents. And, as Kuhn maintains, this is not “an eliminable
imperfection” but “the essential nature of science.”
5. The rational dynamics of Science
Finally, for Kuhn, science and scientific choices are not only rational and objective in spite of the
absence of an algorithmic or quasi-algorithmic methodology, but precisely thanks to such an
absence. The positive evaluation of this situation for science as a collective endeavor on the part
of Kuhn comes from his estimation of “time” (research time, reflection time, discussion time) as a
commodity that improves scientific validation. The problem with decision algorithms, even of
probabilistic algorithms, is their supposedly instantaneous workings. Good science needs time, as
it needs people using that time:
Copernicus’s system, for example, was not more accurate than Ptolemy’s until
drastically revised by Kepler more than sixty years after Copernicus’s death. If Kepler
or someone else had not found other reasons to choose heliocentric astronomy, those
improvements in accuracy would never have been made, and Copernicus’s work might
have been forgotten (Kuhn, 1977, p. 323).
Allowing for time to count is what makes possible the justificatory dynamics of science. In Kuhn’s
terms, standard criteria (i.e., the array of scientific values) should have a role in choices made at
the early stages of a theory, and the recognition (by others than the proponent) of this necessarily
imperfect compliance with them, as field-relevant guides, is what makes possible the survival of a
new idea that may eventually be improved (Kuhn, 1977, p. 331-332).
If time is needed –and it has been needed, since science is what we understand it to be–, then
scientific methodology and the measure of its correction, i.e. its rationality, the objectivity of its
conclusions, cannot be of any instantaneous kind (and this is, precisely, what happens when we
philosophically construe them as success terms). As Kuhn points out, if scientists would share an
algorithmic methodology “all conforming scientists would make the same decision at the same
time” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 332), and this would give no time either for a prospective (and yet much
imperfect) new idea to enter the pool of candidate theories or for the traditional one to yet survive,
awaiting new developments.
This high estimation of “time”, of “collective work” and also of the scientific “division of
labor” is present in the (either simply descriptive or normative) proposals of many contemporary
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philosophers of science, especially those of a pragmatist inclination (Cf. Hacking, 1983; Kitcher,
2012). However, the consequences this has for the argumentative understanding of scientific
justificatory practice have not been, in my opinion, sufficiently stressed. And I would add, that
Kuhn’s old paper is closer to what we need in that direction than other more contemporary
suggestions.
Time is also, ultimately, one of Kuhn’s mitigators of the problems of incommensurability
between paradigms or disciplinary matrixes (Kuhn, 1974). New theories often come with new
ideas about how to order and weigh different values –even if we assume that the basic core of
scientific values remains constitutive of science. But if everything comes at the same time and
offered to be accepted in one pack, it is difficult to avoid problems of circularity and the barrier
between those who accept and those who reject the whole pack becomes rather insurmountable.
In Kuhn’s words:
Clearly, if such value changes had occurred as rapidly or been as complete as the theory
changes to which they are related, then theory choice would be value choice, and
neither could provide justification to the other. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 336).
The other incommensurability mitigator, as I understand it, mentioned in “Objectivity…” (in its
last paragraph, and with very little elaboration) is the possibility that scientist that do not share a
paradigm, a conceptual network or a common vocabulary may nevertheless still “exhibit to each
other, not always easily, the concrete technical results achievable by those who practice within
each theory” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 339).
There could be room, I claim, to render this idea into the framework of “visual argument
from ostension” (Marraud, 2018), but it is not my intention to do so at this time. My point is,
instead, that in his 1977 paper, Kuhn really struggled (even against the usual implications some of
his most cherished ideas) to look for ways to account for the rationality of scientific choices. If, in
Siegel’s terms (1980, p. 366) he could not “have it both ways” (see Section 2), it seems that, at
least in this paper, he chose to emphasize one of them, and bring the other to a minimum. And the
way he chose, even if he did not really make use of argumentative vocabulary, is more than highly
compatible with some of our contemporary approaches in argumentation studies.
6. Conclusion: The value of judgmental subjectivity
In this paper I have tried to do two things. One is using some analytical and conceptual tools
developed within argumentation theory in order to explore and clarify Kuhn’s insights in his wellknown 1977 article, “Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice.” The other is defending
the idea that, beyond the particulars of the set of scientific values proposed by Kuhn and even
beyond their rational (related to reason-giving or argumentative) workings, it is Kuhn’s suggestion
that the ultimate normative concept of science is not exactly objectivity but judgmentability that
deserves our greatest notice.
Such judgmentability is subjective insofar as it is agent-related (only human agents recognize
non-algorithmic reasons and draw conclusions thereof) and should be conceptually construed not
as a set of a priori conditions (of success) a certain content may prove to have for being judgmental,
but as the condition a certain content acquires by being presented for its examination, questioning,
and judging (by others than its proponent) in the public arena of argumentative practice.
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This judgmental subjectivity is, thus, the decisive value that covers, in fact, all kinds of
argumentative practices. Insofar as we understand the scientific way of establishing (still fallible)
conclusions as based on collective argumentative practices, judgmental subjectivity will be its
basic condition.
In a paper critically examining the “practical character of scientific rationality,” J. Vega
(2011, pp. 145-146) enounces three normative conditions regarding the kinds of reasons that we
may expect would constitute the “practical identity of science”:
a) Publicity: any reason adduced within a scientific community must be publicly expressed.
b) Reliability: all good reasons are linked to processes evaluated according to their
reliability.
c) Reflexivity: scientific community is involved in a collective process, on which its
epistemic authority relies, carried out through reflexive strategies leading to the
continuous assessment of the epistemic position from which it exercises its activity.
Conditions (a) and (c) can be easily understood as demanding an argumentative setting (as the one
I have depicted here) for scientific choices. Condition b) is more problematic as its compliance
could be exactly one of the things that is at stake in scientific argumentation. The options with this
condition would be trying to flesh it out in terms of further conditions for reliability (as some
epistemologists do) or expecting from the observance of conditions (a) and (c) that scientists
themselves would come out with adequate standards. What Kuhn shows us, in any case, is that
such standards, even if well established, stabilized, agreed on and honored by the relevant
community will not be of the kind to completely determine the right answer so as to dispense us
from conditions (a) and (c).
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